Common fluctuations in OECD budget balances by Christopher J. Neely & David E. Rapach
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 











Christopher J. Neely 
and 















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 
cleared with the author or authors. Common Fluctuations in OECD Budget Balances
Christopher J. Neely
Research Division
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
P.O. Box 442














We analyze comovements in four measures of budget surpluses for 18 OECD countries for
1980–2008 with a dynamic latent factor model. The world factor in national budget surpluses
declines substantially in the 1980s, rises throughout much of the 1990s to a peak in 2000, be-
fore declining again in the most recent period. This world factor explains a substantial portion
of the variability in budget surpluses across countries. World factors in national output gaps,
dividend-price ratios, and military spending signiﬁcantly explain variation in the world budget
surplus factor. The signiﬁcant relationship between national output gaps and OECD measures
of cyclically adjusted budget surpluses suggests that such cyclical measures inadequately ad-
just for the international business cycle. Sizable ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic components of
national budget surpluses often readily relate to well known “unusual” country circumstances.
JEL classiﬁcations: C32, E62, F42, H62
Keywords: Netlending; Primarybalance; Dynamiclatentfactormodel; Businesscycle; Equity
valuation ratio; Military spending
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The prospect of vast U.S. budget deﬁcits—12.3 percent of GDP in 2009—has returned ﬁscal
issues to the front burner (Calmes, 2009). Analysts typically credit or blame the government
for a country’s ﬁscal situation. Leonhardt (2009), for example, apportions blame for prospective
U.S. deﬁcits to current and past presidents. Although Leonhardt (2009) more-or-less ignores the
legislativebranch, suchassignmentsareappropriateinsomesense: Governmentsdecidehowmuch
to tax and spend and therefore are ultimately responsible for ﬁscal outcomes.
When analyzing ﬁscal balances, however, it is important to consider economic circumstances,
because such circumstances determine the welfare implications and sustainability of ﬁscal policy.
We analyze the effects of international circumstances in the present paper. Two observations moti-
vate our focus on international aspects of ﬁscal balances. First, the growth in economic and ﬁnan-
cial interdependence over the postwar era increases the potential for international circumstances
to inﬂuence national ﬁscal policies. Second, Neely ’s (2003) casual examination of international
comovements in ﬁscal balances illustrates the relevance of international inﬂuences in such matters.
We begin our analysis by estimating a dynamic factor model to identify the latent world factor
underlying ﬁscal surpluses in 18 industrialized countries for 1980–2008. This world factor method
captures covariation among many variables in a uniﬁed framework and has major advantages over
alternative procedures for measuring comovments in national budget surpluses. For example, the
performance of a few large countries will dominate a weighted average of national surpluses. Sim-
ilarly, pair-wise correlations or related statistics are unwieldy, difﬁcult to summarize, and fail to
provide a uniﬁed framework.1
The estimated world budget surplus factor, which can be interpreted as a global budget surplus
index, varies markedly over our sample: declining during the early 1980s and early 1990s, rising
sharply for much of the 1990s to a peak in 2000, before declining again at the end of the sample.
This world factor explains a substantial portion of the variability in four alternative national budget
1Researchers have recently employed dynamic latent factor models to measure global ﬂuctuations in national real
output growth and inﬂation rates; see, for example, Kose et al. (2003, 2008) with respect to real output growth and
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2008), Monacelli and Sala (2009), and Neely and Rapach (2009) with respect to inﬂation.
1surplus measures—net lending, the primary balance, and the cyclically adjusted net lending and
primary balance—across countries. Reassuringly, although our procedure does not weight coun-
tries by output, it still explains a substantial part of the variability in the U.S. surpluses over the
sample.
Wethenexaminetherelationshipsbetweentheworldbudgetsurplusfactorandestimatedworld
factors in national output gaps, equity valuation ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and military spend-
ing. These variables are potentially important determinants of national budget surpluses and can
be viewed as nearly predetermined with respect to ﬁscal balances. Estimated world factors in na-
tional output gaps, price-dividend ratios, and military spending signiﬁcantly explain ﬂuctuations
in the world budget surplus factor. Surprisingly, the world output gap factor even signiﬁcantly ex-
plains the world factor in cyclically adjusted surplus measures. This indicates that OECD cyclical
adjustments do not remove all business cycle variation in such measures. The fact that the world
dividend-price ratio factor explains movements in the world budget surplus factor highlights the
importance of swings in international equity markets in determining common trends in national
budget balances. Finally, the signiﬁcant relationship between world military spending and world
budget surplus factors points to the relevance of geopolitical events, such as the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
In addition to discerning international trends in ﬁscal situations, the dynamic factor model de-
composes a country’s budget surplus into common and idiosyncratic components. We interpret the
common component as the typical response of a country’s budget surplus to international condi-
tions. This allows one to evaluate whether the government’s ﬁscal position is unusual, compared
to its historical record of budget comovement with similar countries. The common component
thus provides a useful benchmark against which to gauge government policies and to highlight
the importance of particular national circumstances—for example, a war, tax changes, a ﬁnancial
crisis, or atypical terms of trade—versus common reactions to international economic conditions
in determining ﬁscal balances and their sustainability. Substantial ﬂuctuations in the estimated id-
iosyncratic components of countries’ national budget surpluses often readily relate to well known
2“unusual” country circumstances. For example, a sharp decline in the idiosyncratic component of
Sweden’s budget surplus in the early 1990s clearly corresponds to the Swedish banking crisis.
While there is a vast ﬁscal literature on topics such as ﬁscal sustainability and the relation
between deﬁcits and growth, there is little work that characterizes international determinants of
deﬁcits in industrialized countries.2 Neely (2003) casually studies recent correlations among na-
tionalbudgetdeﬁcitsandspeculatesthatcommonshockstotechnology, demographics, commodity
prices, and political uncertainty drive this covariance. Aside from Neely’s (2003) very short study,
two literatures study the causes of deﬁcits and therefore are tangentially related to the present issue
of international inﬂuences on budget deﬁcits. First, Roubini and Sachs’s (1989) seminal empirical
work, related to the theoretical study of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), presents evidence that OECD
countries with short-tenure governments and coalition governments are more likely to experience
deﬁcits, although Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and de Haan and Sturm (1997) challenge the Roubini-
Sachs ﬁndings. Second, Lane (2003) ﬁnds that OECD countries with volatile output and dispersed
political power are more likely to exhibit procyclical ﬁscal policies, while Strawczynski and Zeira
(2009) determine that expenditures and deﬁcits react countercyclically to transitory shocks while
government investment reacts procyclically to permanent shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the dynamic factor
model and its estimation. Section 3 describes the data and reports dynamic factor model estimation
results for national budget surpluses, output gaps, equity valuation ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and
military spending. Section 4 analyzes the relationships between world factors in national budget
surpluses and the other variables, while Section 5 examines idiosyncratic components in national
budget surpluses. Section 6 concludes.
2For example, Corsetti and Roubini (1991), Chalk and Hemming (2000), and Heller (2005) consider tests of ﬁscal
sustainability, while Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Kneller et al. (1999), Adam and Bevan (2005), and Heller (2005)
analyze the relation between deﬁcits and growth.
32. Econometric methodology
The dynamic latent factor model is given by
yi;t = bift +ei;t; (1)
where yi;t is the demeaned budget surplus as a share of GDP for country i (i = 1;:::;N) in year
t (t = 1;:::;T).3 The world factor, ft, is common across all of the N = 18 OECD countries we
consider and captures the source of global comovements in national budget surpluses. bi is a
loading measuring the response of an individual country’s budget surplus to ﬂuctuations in the
world factor. The ﬁnal term in (1), ei;t, is an idiosyncratic component or country-speciﬁc factor.
To make (1) a dynamic latent factor model, we permit ft and ei;t to follow autoregressive (AR)
processes. Each idiosyncratic component follows an AR(p) process, while the world factor obeys
an AR(q) process:
ei;t = ri;1ei;t 1++ri;pei;t p+ui;t; (2)
ft = rf;1ft 1++rf;qft q+uf;t; (3)
where ui;t  N(0;s2
i ), uf;t  N(0;s2
f ), and E(ui;tui;t s) = E(uf;tuf;t s) = 0 for s 6= 0. We set
p = q = 1 when estimating the dynamic factor model in Section 3; the results are not sensitive to
other non-zero values for p or q. We make the standard assumption that the shocks in (2) and (3),
ui;t and uf;t, respectively, are uncorrelated contemporaneously and at all leads and lags, implying
that the world and country-speciﬁc factors are orthogonal.
Note that neither the signs nor scales of the factor and factor loadings are separately identiﬁed
in (1). For example, multiplying the world factor by  2 and the loadings by  1=2 produces exactly
the same model. To normalize the signs of the factor and loadings, we restrict the loading on the
world factor for Australia—the ﬁrst country (alphabetically) in our sample—to be positive. To
normalize the scales, we assume that s2
f = 1 (e.g., Sargent and Sims, 1977; Stock and Watson,
1989, 1993). The sign and scale normalizations lack economic content and do not affect any
3In the dynamic latent factor models discussed in Section 3, yi;t can also represent the demeaned national output
gap, dividend-price ratio, unexpected inﬂation rate, or military spending as a share of GDP.
4economic inference. Nevertheless, the factor loadings in Section 3 are typically positive, meaning
that national budget surpluses are nearly all positively related to the world factor.
The dynamic factor model attributes comovements in national budget surpluses solely to the
world factor, ft, via the factor loadings, bi. That is, ft tracks common ﬂuctuations in national
budget surpluses. To provide further intuition, consider two extremes. First, if s2
i = 0 and bi 6= 0
for all i, then yi;t = bift for all i, so that national budget surpluses are perfectly correlated. At the
other extreme, if bi = 0 and s2
i 6= 0 for all i, then yi;t = ei;t for all i, so that the national budget
surpluses are completely uncorrelated. Of course, the patterns in the data are likely to fall between
these extremes.
More formally, we can decompose the variation in a country’s budget surplus into the share
attributable to the world factor, ft, and the idiosyncratic component, ei;t. Given that the factors are













i ) is the proportion of the total variability in country i’s budget surplus attributable
to the world factor (idiosyncratic component). As discussed above, the world factor will explain a
larger proportion of the variation in countries with high bi and low var(ei;t) values. That is, these
countries will have a higher qworld
i (and lower q
country
i ) and thus be more closely tied to global
ﬂuctuations in national budget surpluses.
We could include additional factors in (1) corresponding to, for example, regions, exchange
rate systems, or trading blocs. Since all factors are assumed orthogonal, however, the inclusion of
additional factors will not affect the estimates of ft, bi, or qworld
i in the dynamic latent factor model
and so will not affect any of our inferences concerning the world factor.
Because the latent nature of the world factor precludes the use of conventional regression meth-
5ods, we follow Otrok and Whiteman (1998) and Kose et al. (2003, 2008) in estimating the model
with a Bayesian approach using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We draw from
the joint posterior distribution of the world factor, idiosyncratic components, and model parameters
by successively drawing from a series of conditional distributions. We compute posterior distri-
bution properties for the world factor, idiosyncratic components, and model parameters based on
10,000 MCMC replications after 2,000 burn-in replications. Otrok and Whiteman (1998) detail the
estimation procedure. Because qworld
i and q
country
i are functions of the model parameters and data,
the MCMC algorithm also implies a posterior draw for these statistics for each MCMC replication.
To implement Bayesian analysis, we use the following diffuse conjugate priors, which are
similar to those used in Otrok and Whiteman (1998) and Kose et al. (2003, 2008):
bi  N(0;1) (i = 1;:::;N); (7)
(ri;1;:::;ri;p)0  N[0;diag(1;0:5;:::;0:5p 1)] (i = 1;:::;N); (8)
(rf;1;:::;rf;q)0  N[0;diag(1;0:5;:::;0:5q 1)]; (9)
s2
i  IG(6;0:001) (i = 1;:::;N); (10)
where IG denotes the inverse-gamma distribution. Equations (8) and (9) imply that the prior dis-
tributions for the AR parameters become more tightly centered on zero as the lag length increases.
The prior for the idiosyncratic shock variances given by (10) is very diffuse; Otrok and Whiteman
(1998) point out that only the ﬁrst two moments exist for this proper prior. The results reported in
this paper are not sensitive to reasonable perturbations of these priors.
We also assume that the AR processes in (2) and (3) are stationary, which implies that na-
tional budget surpluses are I(0) processes.4 This assumption is consistent with the fact that an
intertemporal government budget constraint implies an I(0) budget deﬁcit.
We could estimate the dynamic latent factor model using principal components in a classical,
rather than Bayesian, framework. Stock and Watson (2002) and Bai (2003) show that princi-
4We enforce the stationarity restrictions by discarding draws of the AR parameters that do not satisfy the restric-
tions. We do the same to enforce the sign restriction on the factor loading for Australia. Inadmissible AR parameters
and Australian loadings are rarely drawn, especially after the burn-in replications.
6pal components provide consistent estimates of the factors and parameters in (1), and Bai (2003)
provides asymptotic distribution theory for statistical inference. While Bai (2003) derived the
asymptotic behavior of his estimator, we are uncertain of its properties in a sample of the size we
use here. Principal component factor and parameter estimates are similar to the Bayesian point
estimates, but we report only the Bayesian estimates for brevity.5
3. Dynamic latent factor model estimation results
3.1. Data
We consider four OECD measures of a country’s ﬁscal position: (i) net lending as a share of
GDP, (ii) primary balance as a share of GDP, (iii) cyclically adjusted net lending as a share of
potential GDP, (iv) cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of potential GDP. Net lending
is the most common measure of a country’s ﬁscal situation—it is the general government budget
surplus. The primary balance excludes interest payments from net lending. Cyclically adjusted net
lending and primary balances are attempts by the OECD to measure the ﬁscal balance if the output
gap were zero.6 We use data from all 18 OECD countries that have full-data samples for each of
the four measures for the period 1980 to 2008 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States).
We wish to explain the common variation in our budget surplus measures with other variables
that can reasonably be viewed as predetermined with respect to the budget surplus. The output
gap is an obvious candidate to explain cyclically unadjusted surpluses. Another candidate is the
dividend-price ratio, a proxy for transitory but potentially persistent ﬂuctuations in equity prices
that provide temporary revenues through capital gains taxes. For example, the U.S. dividend yield
5The complete principal component estimates are available upon request from the authors.
6The OECD denotes the four measures as “central government net lending—as a percentage of GDP,” “government
primary balance—as a percentage of GDP,” “cyclically adjusted government net lending—as a percentage of potential
GDP,” and “cyclically adjusted government primary balance—as a percentage of potential GDP.” The OECD describes
their cyclical adjustment method at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/61/36336878.pdf.
7and U.S. capital gains taxes as a share of GDP have a correlation of  0:62 from 1970 to 2008.
Unexpected inﬂation has potential effects on debt ﬁnancing. Finally, we consider whether trends
in military spending help to explain budget balances. Governments might treat defense spending
variation as they typically treat wars, as a temporary change in expenditures to be accommodated
by deﬁcit ﬁnancing rather than suboptimal discrete changes in taxation.
We use output gap and CPI price level data from the OECD and dividend-price ratio data from
Global Financial Data.7 We obtain military spending data from various issues of World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), which is compiled by the U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Veriﬁcation and Compliance and obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR).8 Military spending is measured as a share of GDP.
3.2. Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the ﬁscal surplus measures from 1980 to 2008. The av-
erage ﬁscal surplus (net lending) was  2:4 percent of GDP and the average standard deviation was
3.4 percentage points. Extreme deﬁcits or surpluses were fairly common: seven of the 18 coun-
tries exhibited at least one deﬁcit exceeding 10 percent of GDP, while four experienced at least one
surplus exceeding 5 percent of GDP. Cyclically adjusted deﬁcits were somewhat less variable than
the unadjusted deﬁcits, with a standard deviation of 2.8 percentage points. The average primary
balances were near zero, indicating that government revenues matched expenditures during this
sample, when one excludes interest payments on previously accumulated debt.
Figure 1 shows the time series of annual ﬁscal surpluses for the 18 OECD countries during
the 1980–2008 sample. The solid (dashed) blue lines indicate (cyclically adjusted) net lending,
while the solid (dashed) red lines indicate the (cyclically adjusted) primary balance. The cyclical
7The OECD denotes these variables as “Output gap of the total economy” and “Consumer Price Index.” We
measure unexpected inﬂation as the ﬁrst difference in the CPI inﬂation rate (Atkeson and Ohanian, 2001). Full-
sample dividend-price ratio data are unavailable for Iceland, Ireland, and Spain, and we exclude these countries when
estimating the dividend-price ratio world factor in Section 3.4.
8The current issue of the WMEAT is available at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/, while back issues were
downloaded from http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00061.xml. Military spending data are avail-
able through 2005. Data are unavailable for Iceland, and we exclude Iceland when estimating the military spending
world factor in Section 3.4.
8adjustment has the most pronounced impact on Norway’s ﬁscal balances. Norway is also unusual
in that its primary balances are more negative than the full balances, presumably because it receives
signiﬁcant revenues from oil exports and its sovereign wealth fund, created in 1990. A glance at the
ﬁgure reveals that the ﬁscal balances tend to move together; for example, ﬁscal situations improve
in the late 1990s across countries. We next formally measure the common component in national
budget surpluses with the dynamic latent factor model.
3.3. Estimation results for national budget surpluses
For each budget surplus measure, Figure 2 shows the mean as well as the 0.10 and 0.90 quan-
tilesoftheposteriordistributionforthecountryloadingsontheworldbudgetsurplusfactor. Except
for those of Japan (Norway and Japan), the estimated loadings are always positive for net lending,
cyclically adjusted net lending, and the primary balance (cyclically adjusted primary balance).9
Increases in the world factor thus imply rising budget surpluses for nearly every country. Japan’s
negative loadings are unsurprising in light of the particular macroeconomic challenges faced by
Japan over much of the sample, including the “lost decade” of the 1990s. Norway’s negative load-
ing for the cyclically adjusted primary balance likely reﬂects the large inﬂuence that oil exports
have on its economy and budget.10
Figure 3 displays the mean and 0.10, 0.33, 0.66, and 0.90 quantiles of the posterior distribution
for the world factor in each of the four budget surplus measures.11 Removing interest payments
from the budget balances makes relatively little difference to the general patterns in the world
factors; compare the world factors for net lending and the primary balance. Figure 3 illustrates
signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in the world factor for each of the ﬁscal surpluses: a fall in the early 1980s,
a rise to a local maximum in 1989, another downturn to a trough in 1993, a subsequent rise leading
toaglobalmaximumin2000, andadeclinethereafter. Overall, Figure3illustratessizablecommon
9We use the mean of the posterior distribution as the point estimate.
10The United Kingdom was also an oil exporter for most of the sample, but its oil exports were smaller in absolute
value and much less important compared to the size of its economy and government budget.
11Observe that the world budget surplus factor is an index, so that a world surplus factor of zero in Figure 3 does
not necessarily represent a balanced budget.
9variation in national budget surpluses.
Figure 4 illustrates the qworld
i variance decompositions, which measure the extent to which
global inﬂuences affect national ﬁscal balances. As in Figure 2, the blue circle corresponds to the
mean of the posterior distribution, while the blue bars delineate 0.10 and 0.90 quantiles. On aver-
age across the 18 countries, the point estimates indicate that the world factor explains 50 percent
of total variance for net lending, 39 percent for cyclically adjusted net lending, 38 percent for the
primary balance, and 30 percent for the cyclically adjusted primary balance. The variance decom-
positions are precisely measured. The difference between the cyclically adjusted and unadjusted
measures suggests that the world business cycle explains part of the global inﬂuence on deﬁcits,
but the variation in the cyclically adjusted measures indicates that there are other important global
inﬂuences, as well. Likewise, excluding interest payments from the deﬁcit measures, as in the
primary balance and the cyclically adjusted primary balance, reduces the variance attributable to
the world factor. But the world factor still explains 30 percent of the variance in cyclically adjusted
primary balances, on average, across the 18 countries.12
To summarize, Figures 2–4 characterize sizable common ﬂuctuations in OECD national budget
surpluses, which represent a signiﬁcant portion of the variability in national budget surpluses.
These global inﬂuences on ﬁscal balances extend beyond common business cycle and interest rate
effects.
3.4. Estimation results for predetermined variables
To explain the variation in the four measures of ﬁscal balances, we ﬁrst compute world factors
for national output gaps, dividend-price ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and military spending, which
we treat as nearly predetermined driving variables. We compute the world factors in these variables
in the same way that we computed the world factors for the ﬁscal balances. Figure 5 displays the
mean and 0.10 and 0.90 quantiles for each country’s loading on the world factor for each of the
12As expected, the bi and qworld
i estimates are positively correlated across countries, with correlation coefﬁcients
of 0.46, 0.45, 0.46, and 0.20 for net lending, cyclically adjusted net lending, the primary balance, and the cyclically
adjusted primary balance, respectively.
10quasi-exogenous variables. The point estimates of the loadings indicate that each variable for each
country is positively related to the world factor, with the exception of military spending for Japan.
Figure 6 portrays the estimated world factor for each of the predetermined variables. The world
factor for the output gap displays a similar temporal pattern to that in net lending and the primary
balance. The 1990s bull market in global equities is clearly evident in the dividend yield world
factor (high equity prices and thus low dividend-price ratios), as well as the recent global market
“correction.” The world factor in unexpected inﬂation appears to covary with the world output gap
factor, in line with an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. The world factor in military spend-
ing is fairly steady during the 1980s before starting a long decline around 1989, corresponding to
the fall of the Berlin Wall. World factors in output gaps, dividend-price ratios, unexpected inﬂa-
tion, and military spending ﬂuctuate substantially from 1980 to 2008 and are reasonably precisely
estimated, except for the military spending factor.13 The next section formally explains the world
ﬁscal surplus factors with the world factors for the four predetermined variables.
4. Relating predetermined variables to budget surpluses
A priori, we expect that the output gap signiﬁcantly explains net lending and primary balances,
but not the cyclically adjusted versions of those measures. We also conjecture that the dividend-
price ratio is negatively related to all ﬁscal balances through capital gains taxes, because as stock
pricesexceedfundamentalvalues, governmentrevenueswillriseabovetypicallevels. Examination
of U.S. capital gains tax receipt data—omitted for brevity—indicates that such receipts can vary
by almost 1 percent of GDP within a few years. Unexpected inﬂation could inﬂuence ﬁscal deﬁcits
in either direction. On the one hand, if higher unexpected inﬂation signals an adverse aggregate
supply shock, then one would expect it to reduce ﬁscal surpluses. Similarly, higher unexpected
inﬂation could increase the cost of ﬁnancing the short-term portion of the debt. On the other
13The world factors typically explain a substantial portion of the variability in national output gaps, price-dividend
ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and military spending, with averages across countries of 0.39, 0.61, 0.28, and 0.52,
respectively. For brevity, we do not report the complete results for the variance decompositions, which are available
upon request from the authors.
11hand, if monetary stimulus produces unexpected inﬂation, one might expect a larger ﬁscal surplus.
Finally, we expect that defense spending would be negatively related to all ﬁscal balances. That is,
we expect that taxes would not be immediately adjusted for changes in defense spending.
Toexploredeterminantsofbudgetbalances, weregresstheworldﬁscalsurplusfactorsonworld
factors for the output gaps, dividend-price ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and military spending. We
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We estimate (11) and (12) using OLS, accounting for autocorrelation with Newey and West (1987)
standard errors.
We present the regressions results with two caveats. First, the factors on both the left- and
right-hand-side of the regressions are generated variables. The error in the left-hand-side variables
(i.e., the world budget surplus factors) will decrease the apparent amount of predictability in the
relations, causing the estimated R2 to understate the R2 that is theoretically expected, in the absence
of measurement error, because the estimated total sum of squares will exceed the total sum of
squares without measurement error. Likewise, the error in the predetermined variables on the right-
hand-side will attenuate their estimated coefﬁcients toward zero and thus inﬂate their p-values.
Therefore, the error in the factor estimation will cause our regressions to present a conservative
picture of the relation between the ﬁscal surpluses and predetermined variables.
Second, weviewtheright-hand-sidevariablesin(11)and(12)asnearlypredetermined. Strictly
speaking, these variables are endogenous, meaning that the coefﬁcients will be subject to simul-
taneity bias. We believe that the explanatory variables are largely predetermined, however, and
12unlikely to react strongly to contemporaneous ﬁscal balances. Therefore, we do not believe that
simultaneity bias will strongly inﬂuence our results.14
Table2presentsthebivariateandmultipleregressionresultsforallfourﬁscalsurplusmeasures.
Thesample is1980–2008, exceptforregressions includingmilitary spending, forwhich thesample
is 1980–2005. Given that including military spending reduces the sample length, we estimate
multiple regression models with and without this variable.
Inthebivariateregressions, theoutputgapfactorispositiveandsigniﬁcantatthe1percentlevel
for net lending and the primary balance, with substantial R2 statistics of 45 and 48 percent, respec-
tively. That is, international business cycle ﬂuctuations are signiﬁcantly associated with cyclically
unadjusted ﬁscal surpluses, presumably through the familiar tax and spending channels. Surpris-
ingly, however, the output gap factor is also signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the cyclically
adjusted surpluses, with still sizable R2 statistics of 20 and 15 percent, respectively. The OECD’s
cyclical adjustments do not completely capture international business cycle effects on budgets.
Consistent with the idea that higher equity prices increase capital gains tax revenues, the
dividend-price ratio factor is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the primary balance and cycli-
cally adjusted primary balance factors in the bivariate regressions. The R2 statistics are sizable,
24 and 44 percent for the primary balance and cyclically adjusted primary balance, respectively.
Our results indicate that global bull (bear) equity markets signiﬁcantly raise (decrease) the primary
balance in industrialized countries. The dividend-price ratio factor is not signiﬁcantly related to the
net lending or cyclically adjusted net lending factor, although the relationship is nearly signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent level for the cyclically adjusted net lending factor. The dividend-price factor ex-
plains more of the variability in primary balances than in the non-primary surpluses. A systematic
relationship between global equity valuations and interest rates could create this difference.
The unexpected inﬂation factor signiﬁcantly explains each ﬁscal surplus factor in the bivariate
regressions. As noted in Section 3.4, the unexpected inﬂation factor is positively correlated with
14Our exercise is similar in spirit to Crucini et al. (2008) in the context of explaining the G-7 business cycle. They
ﬁrst estimate a world factor in G-7 real output growth rates, which they then explain using world factors in G-7
measures of productivity, ﬁscal policy, monetary policy, oil prices, and terms of trade.
13the output gap factor, so that the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients on the unexpected inﬂation
factor likely capture similar business cycle effects.
Themilitaryspendingfactorissigniﬁcantatthe1percentlevelinthebivariateregressionmodel
for each ﬁscal surplus factor. The R2 statistics are substantial, ranging from 38 to 57 percent. The
estimated negative coefﬁcients point to a global peace dividend: Decreases in military spending
across countries lead to improved ﬁscal balances across countries.
In the multiple regressions, the output gap factor remains signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for
the two cyclically unadjusted ﬁscal surplus factors and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for the
cyclically adjusted primary balance. This conﬁrms the evidence that the cyclical adjustments do
not completely capture international business cycle effects. The dividend-price ratio factor is sig-
niﬁcantly related to the primary balance and cyclically adjusted primary balance factors at the 1
percent level but is not signiﬁcant for net lending or its cyclically adjusted counterpart. Unexpected
inﬂation coefﬁcients are negative and no longer signiﬁcant in any of the multiple regressions, prob-
ably because it is strongly correlated with the output gap factor. The military spending factor sig-
niﬁcantly explains all of the ﬁscal surplus factors at conventional levels, with the exception of the
primary balance factor. The R2 statistics in the ﬁfth column of Table 2 show that world factors
in the four predetermined variables collectively explain much of the variability in the surplus fac-
tors, especially for the cyclically unadjusted and adjusted primary balance factors, where the R2
statistics are both nearly 80 percent.15
When we exclude the military spending factor in the multiple regression models and use a
1980–2008 sample, the output gap and dividend-price ratio factors are both signiﬁcant at least at
the 10 percent level for each of the four surplus factors. The unexpected inﬂation factor remains
insigniﬁcant at conventional levels in each of the four regressions. The R2 statistics continue to be
substantial in the ﬁnal column of Table 2, ranging from 34 to 70 percent.
In summary, Table 3 indicates that the output gap, price-dividend ratio, and military spending
15To get a sense of the appropriateness of the quasi-exogeneity assumption, we also computed instrumental variable
estimatesofthemultipleregressionmodelcoefﬁcientswithlaggedvaluesofthenearlypredeterminedvariablesserving
as instruments. The inferences are similar to those obtained from Table 2, so that endogeneity bias does not appear to
be important.
14world factors substantially determine ﬂuctuations in ﬁscal surplus world factors. Unexpected in-
ﬂation also has predictive value when considered by itself but not in conjunction with the other
variables. Global expansions, bullish equity markets, and military spending reductions improve
ﬁscal balances across industrialized countries.16
5. Idiosyncratic components
Our method of investigating international inﬂuences on ﬁscal balances permits us to isolate the
effect of domestic events on ﬁscal balances. That is, we can examine the common and idiosyncratic
components of budget surpluses to determine the effect of domestic events or policies. Figure 7
displays common and idiosyncratic components for selected countries’ net lending.17
The top left panel of Figure 7 shows demeaned U.S. net lending and its two components, the
common component—the product of the world factor and its loading—and the U.S. idiosyncratic
component. Demeaned net lending is the sum of the common and idiosyncratic components, of
course. The ﬁgure illustrates that both global and idiosyncratic components contributed to the
major movements in U.S. net lending over the sample. For example, both components contributed
to the increase in deﬁcits in the early 1980s and the movement from substantial deﬁcits to surplus
in the 1990s. The substantial deterioration in the U.S. ﬁscal balance in 2001 was mostly due to
the U.S. idiosyncratic component, however. That is, U.S. factors—such as the 2001 tax cuts, the
September 11th attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—bore the lion’s share of the blame
for the decline in the ﬁscal situation during that period.
The upper right panel of Figure 7 portrays the idiosyncratic components for a pair of highly
indebted European countries, Belgium and Greece. The idiosyncratic components were quite dif-
16We also estimated ﬁxed-effects panel regression models with national ﬁscal surpluses serving as regressands and
national output gaps, price-dividend ratios, unexpected inﬂation, and military spending serving as regressors. (The
complete results are not reported for brevity and are available upon request from the authors.) The national output gap
and military spending are signiﬁcant determinants of national net lending and cyclically adjusted net lending, while
the national output gap, dividend-price ratio, and military spending are signiﬁcantly related to the national primary
balance and cyclically adjusted primary balance. Of course, panel estimation does not explicitly identify world factors
in national budget surpluses and their determinants—the focus of this paper—but it does appear to pick up aspects of
the links that we document in Table 2.
17The complete set of common and idiosyncratic components are available upon request from the authors.
15ferent in these two countries during the 1980s. Both countries, however, faced pressure in the
1990s to reduce their debt and deﬁcits to levels required by the Maastricht Treaty for entry into the
European Economic and Monetary Union on January 1, 1999. This regional inﬂuence is clearly
evident during the 1990s for these countries’ idiosyncratic components.
The lower left panel of Figure 7 shows the common and idiosyncratic components for Sweden
and highlights the important role played by the Swedish banking crisis of 1990–1994. During the
late 1980s, the idiosyncratic component contributed to a marked improvement in Sweden’s ﬁscal
surplus. With the advent of the banking crisis, however, Sweden was forced to spend relatively
large sums recapitalizing its banking systems, resulting in a sharp decrease in the idiosyncratic
component during the early 1990s. The common component also decreased in the early 1990s, so
that the early 1990s are characterized by a steep decline in overall Swedish net lending. As ex-
pected, the resolution of the banking crisis led to a sizable increase in the idiosyncratic component
during the late 1990s.
Finally, thelowerrightpanelofFigure7illustratestheimportanceoftheoilmarketforNorway.
In addition to the Norwegian idiosyncratic component, the ﬁgure shows the value of Norwegian
oil exports as a share of GDP. The two variables clearly move together, indicating that oil revenues
are especially important for improving the ﬁscal situation in Norway. Observe, however, that oil
revenues moved up while the idiosyncratic component moved down around 1990. This likely
reﬂects the inﬂuence of the Scandinavian banking crisis, which affected Norway and appeared to
start earlier than the Swedish crisis (Vale, 2004). The increase in oil revenues during this time
helped to cushion the negative budgetary impulse of the banking crisis.
In summary, decomposing net lending into common and idiosyncratic components allows us
to more easily evaluate the effects of domestic events and policies on a country’s ﬁscal situation.
6. Conclusion
The emergence of the prospect of unprecedented deﬁcits in the United States has rekindled
interest in the causes of such imbalances and the question of responsibility for them. Properly
16addressing these imbalances requires understanding their sources and inﬂuences, including inter-
national inﬂuences.
While researchers, such asRoubini andSachs (1989), have examinedhow political polarization
might affect deﬁcits, and others, such as Lane (2003), have evaluated the cyclicality of deﬁcits,
there has been no signiﬁcant previous work on internationally driven comovements in deﬁcits.
This paper identiﬁes substantial international comovements in four budget surplus measures for 18
OECD countries for 1980–2008 with a dynamic latent factor model. Depending on the measure
of the ﬁscal surplus, the world factor explains between 30 and 50 percent of surplus variability, on
average, across countries. The world factor explains 37 percent of the variation in U.S. net lending,
for example.
World factors in national output gaps, dividend-price ratios, and military spending usually
signiﬁcantly explain variation in the four world ﬁscal surplus factors. Surprisingly, the output
gap factor signiﬁcantly explains not only the net lending and primary balance factors, but the
cyclically adjusted versions of those measures. This indicates that the OECD cyclical adjustments
do not completely remove the contribution of the international business cycle on ﬁscal balances.
The importance of the world dividend-price ratio factor highlights the role of global equity market
conditions in affecting ﬁscal balances, while the signiﬁcance of the military spending factor points
to an international peace dividend in the 1990s.
Our results show that international business cycle, equity market, and military spending trends
create common ﬂuctuations in national budget surpluses. The discovery of a signiﬁcant global
factor in international budget deﬁcits suggests avenues for future research. What global political
economy incentives inﬂuence ﬁscal balances? Do individual governments respond optimally to
these international shocks? Can individual country characteristics explain varying sensitivities of
national ﬁscal balances to international inﬂuences? Our ﬁndings highlight the relevance of such
questions.
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20Table 1
Summary statistics for annual budget surpluses, 18 OECD countries, 1980–2008
Country Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Net lending as a share of GDP Cyclically adjusted net lending as a share of potential GDP
Australia  0:015 0.026  0:055 0:020  0:014 0.024  0:050 0:020
Austria  0:028 0.014  0:059  0:002  0:025 0.012  0:053  0:008
Belgium  0:054 0.048  0:160 0:004  0:050 0.043  0:157 0:003
Canada  0:032 0.040  0:091 0:029  0:030 0.035  0:085 0:021
Denmark  0:083 0.039  0:108 0:051  0:007 0.032  0:090 0:054
Finland 0:018 0.041  0:083 0:069 0:024 0.026  0:031 0:061
France  0:030 0.013  0:064  0:001  0:029 0.012  0:059  0:008
Greece  0:071 0.031  0:140  0:023  0:071 0.032  0:141  0:024
Iceland  0:005 0.030  0:047 0:063  0:006 0.025  0:044 0:051
Ireland  0:034 0.054  0:133 0:047  0:033 0.052  0:141 0:031
Italy  0:072 0.040  0:124  0:009  0:068 0.041  0:123  0:005
Japan  0:035 0.034  0:112 0:021  0:035 0.031  0:109 0:011
Netherlands  0:029 0.026  0:092 0:020  0:026 0.022  0:080 0:012
Norway 0:070 0.059  0:019 0:200  0:010 0.023  0:060 0:233
Spain  0:032 0.027  0:073 0:022  0:026 0.024  0:068 0:020
Sweden  0:014 0.044  0:112 0:037  0:013 0.033  0:076 0:032
United Kingdom  0:029 0.025  0:080 0:037  0:028 0.020  0:070 0:010
United States  0:033 0.020  0:058 0:016  0:031 0.018  0:053 0:009
Average  0:024 0.034  0:089 0:033  0:027 0.028  0:083 0:018
Primary balance as a share of GDP Cyclically adjusted primary balance as a share of potential GDP
Australia 0:011 0.019  0:023 0.039 0:012 0.016  0:013 0:039
Austria  0:003 0.014  0:026 0.025 0:000 0.011  0:020 0:018
Belgium 0:022 0.039  0:088 0.065 0:025 0.036  0:085 0:066
Canada  0:001 0.036  0:064 0.060 0:002 0.033  0:054 0:059
Denmark 0:024 0.037  0:074 0.095 0:025 0.030  0:057 0:080
Finland 0:015 0.040  0:087 0.079 0:020 0.025  0:035 0:071
France  0:008 0.011  0:037 0.011  0:007 0.010  0:033 0:009
Greece  0:009 0.032  0:061 0.038  0:010 0.034  0:067 0:043
Iceland  0:002 0.026  0:040 0.056  0:003 0.022  0:042 0:044
Ireland 0:001 0.040  0:075 0.056 0:001 0.041  0:092 0:043
Italy 0:000 0.034  0:067 0.058 0:003 0.036  0:071 0:068
Japan  0:021 0.034  0:097 0.033  0:021 0.032  0:094 0:027
Netherlands 0:005 0.022  0:048 0.049 0:008 0.019  0:037 0:033
Norway 0:023 0.038  0:052 0.082  0:070 0.045  0:136  0:005
Spain  0:009 0.028  0:063 0.033  0:003 0.023  0:042 0:032
Sweden  0:011 0.044  0:116 0.147  0:010 0.034  0:084 0:034
United Kingdom  0:002 0.025  0:056 0.060  0:002 0.021  0:046 0:034
United States  0:006 0.020  0:032 0.041  0:004 0.019  0:030 0:035
Average 0:002 0.030  0:061 0.052  0:002 0.027  0:058 0:041
Note: “Average” is the average across all of the countries.Table 2
OLS estimation results, bivariate and multiple regression models, 1980–2008
Multiple regression,
Bivariate regression Multiple regression excluding military spending
Regressor Coefﬁcient (t-statistic) R2 Coefﬁcient (t-statistic) R2 Coefﬁcient (t-statistic) R2
A. Regressand = Net lending, world factor
Output gap, world factor 0.93 (3.54) 45% 0.75 (2.90) 71% 0.97 (3.25) 52%
Dividend-price ratio, world factor  0:62 ( 1:29) 9%  0:27 ( 1:16)  0:58 ( 1:72)
Unexpected inﬂation, world factor 2.35 (3.20) 19%  0:40 ( 0:61)  0:38 ( 0:58)
Military spending, world factor  2:22 ( 5:49) 42%  1:54 ( 3:78)
B. Regressand = Cyclically adjusted net lending, world factor
Output gap, world factor 0.54 (2.01) 20% 0.32 (1.23) 61% 0.55 (1.82) 34%
Dividend-price ratio, world factor  0:70 ( 1:63) 15%  0:35 ( 1:42)  0:68 ( 1:89)
Unexpected inﬂation, world factor 1.61 (2.22) 12%  0:22 ( 0:33)  0:21 ( 0:30)
Military spending, world factor  2:16 ( 6:03) 55%  1:62 ( 4:21)
C. Regressand = Primary balance, world factor
Output gap, world factor 0.82 (4.44) 48% 0.79 (4.43) 79% 0.88 (4.76) 70%
Dividend-price ratio, world factor  0:84 ( 2:18) 24%  0:98 ( 5:41)  0:84 ( 3:14)
Unexpected inﬂation, world factor 2.11 (2.78) 22%  0:42 ( 0:81)  0:61 ( 1:18)
Military spending, world factor  1:87 ( 3:71) 38%  0:38 ( 1:23)
D. Regressand = Cyclically adjusted primary balance, world factor
Output gap, world factor 0.36 (2.01) 15% 0.29 (2.11) 78% 0.39 (2.52) 58%
Dividend-price ratio, world factor  0:89 ( 2:87) 44%  0:95 ( 6:00)  0:91 ( 3:39)
Unexpected inﬂation, world factor 1.21 (1.71) 12%  0:25 ( 0:62)  0:40 ( 0:89)
Military spending, world factor  1:80 ( 4:82) 57%  0:62 ( 2:34)
Notes: t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. The sample is 1980–2005 for regression models that include military spending, world
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Fig. 1. Annual budget surpluses, 18 OECD countries, 1980–2008. Solid blue line is net lending as a share of GDP; dashed blue
line is cyclically adjusted net lending as a share of potential GDP; solid red line is primary balance as a share of GDP; dashed red line is
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Fig. 2. Loadings on the world factor for budget surpluses, 1980–2008. Circle indicates the mean and vertical bars delineate 0.10
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Fig. 3. World factors for budget surpluses, 1980–2008. Black line delineates the mean of the posterior distribution. Blue (red) lines
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i variance decompositions for budget surpluses, 1980–2008. Circle indicates the mean and vertical bars delineate 0.10




























Fig. 5. Loadings on the world factor for predetermined variables, 1980–2008. Circle indicates the mean and vertical bars delineate




























Fig. 6. World factors for predetermined variables, 1980–2008. Black line delineates the mean of the posterior distribution. Blue
(red) lines delineate the 0.33 and 0.66 (0.10 and 0.90) quantiles for the posterior distribution. The world factor for military spending is
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Fig. 7. Common and idiosyncratic components for demeaned net lending, 1980–2008, selected countries.